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European solidarity is in high demand but short supply. By using 
survey evidence on attitudes towards European solidarity, conducted 
by YouGov in 11 member states (April 2018), the paper explores viable 
strategies for leveraging European solidarity. The survey reveals three 
important findings:
1. Public support for European solidarity varies by issue (solidarity 
for what?), by instrument (solidarity how?) and by member state 
(solidarity by whom for whom?).
2. Variance in support offers opportunities for leveraging European 
solidarity by linking different issues and instruments
3. European publics are often uncertain in their attitudes towards 
European solidarity. This opens space for political leadership on 
European solidarity by issue- and instrument-linkage. Voters, 
who in large majority wish to stay in the EU, should be ready to 
listen.
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I. The demand-supply gap 
European solidarity is in high demand but short supply. 
Following the global financial crisis of 2008, the demand-
supply gap has grown considerably, seriously fraying the 
social, economic, institutional and political cohesion of 
the European Union (EU). Just consider the following 
examples: 
• The Eurozone crisis quickly turned into a blame 
game between creditor and debtor countries that left 
the burden of saving the Euro mostly to the (consti-
tutionally inadequate) ECB. 
• In some member states (youth) unemployment rose 
to levels not seen since the 1930s, while leaving other 
member states unaffected and seemingly uncon-
cerned. 
• The refugee crisis led to finger-pointing between 
frontline states, transit states, host states, and unaf-
fected bystanders while (not so) temporary border 
controls sprang up throughout the Schengen area. 
• Calls for more unity in European Security and 
Defence policy go hand in hand with manifest dis-
agreement on defence spending and the pooling and 
sharing of defence equipment, technology, and pro-
duction. 
How can the demand-supply gap be closed? There are 
two approaches. One is to reduce demand for solidarity 
through disintegration. This is the Brexit approach. The 
partial or complete exit from the EU and its common pol-
icies reduces the need for risk and burden sharing with 
other EU states and societies. The solidarity gap is closed 
by dismantling policies and institutions that require sol-
idarity. 
The other approach is to increase supply of solidarity. 
This is the EU approach. The Treaties are replete with 
exhortations of solidarity, social cohesion, mutual assis-
tance, etc.: “Europe can be built only through real prac-
tical achievements which will first of all create real soli-
darity” (Preamble of the ECSC Treaty). Yet, as the crises 
of the past decade demonstrate, the meaning of real sol-
idarity is essentially contested. The supply of solidarity is 
often blocked by disagreement about who owes what to 
whom, when and where. 
How can the zone of agreement be expanded? How can 
European solidarity be leveraged to achieve the most 
effective risk and burden sharing between member states 
with the least risk of antagonising anybody? In this paper 
we use new survey evidence on attitudes towards Euro-
pean solidarity in eleven member states to map areas 
of agreement and disagreement on European solidarity 
across policy issues, policy instruments, and member 
states. This helps to identify politically viable issues and 
strategies for expanding European solidarity and to 
develop persuasive narratives for explaining them to the 
broader public.
II. What is European solidarity?
Solidarity refers to the normative expectation of mutual 
support among the members of large anonymous 
groups (the class, the party, the nation). Group members 
ought to share one another’s risks and burdens in order to 
secure the goals and cohesiveness of the group as a whole: 
one for all, all for one, with no one left behind. 
The advantage of solidarity is that it provides the members 
of a group with insurance against ‘bad risks’. This allows 
individual members to accept more risk, and enables the 
group as a whole to pursue more ambitious goals and to 
better defend its cohesiveness under conditions of adver-
sity. Yet, there are also disadvantages:
• Solidarity is costly. It requires that group members 
pass some of their own physical, financial, human or 
organisational resources to members of the group in 
order to improve the well-being, or reduce the suf-
fering of these other members. Solidarity involves 
sharing in a real, material sense. 
• Solidarity is uneven. Solidarity involves transfers 
from better-off to less well-off group members. The 
transfers are zero-sum, at least in the short term. 
They flow from good risks to bad risks, from givers 
to takers, from net-contributors to net-beneficiaries 
with no immediate compensation. 
▶ The signature crisis 
of the EU today is a 
solidarity crisis
▶ The task at hand is 
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• Solidarity breeds moral hazard. Solidarity unbur-
dens actors from the need to self-protect against bad 
risk. This may induce careless or even openly exploit-
ative and fraudulent behaviour that triggers unneces-
sary bad risks, i.e. risks that could have been avoided 
through appropriate self-protection, and thus further 
increasing the costs of solidarity. 
There are solutions to each of these problems but they 
are somewhat contradictory. To reduce the costs of sol-
idarity, risk should be put on many shoulders. The risk 
pool should be large. To avoid the same actors always 
ending up at the paying-end of the solidarity relation, 
the risk pool should be heterogeneous so as to increase 
the chances of turn-taking in solidary giving and taking. 
Yet, to reduce moral hazard, the risk pool should be kept 
small and homogeneous. People tend to trust people who 
are like them because they have more scruples before 
betraying each other. 
Given these inherent contradictions, real world systems 
of solidarity rely extensively on institutional support 
structures: borders and hierarchies. Borders restrict the 
territorial and social reach of solidarity to the members 
of a well-defined group. The rise of the national welfare 
state was linked to the emergence of social citizenship to 
clearly demarcate the boundary between thick national 
and thin cross-border solidarity. The rise of the welfare 
state was also associated with the growth of nation-wide 
administrative structures for the provision of welfare sup-
port, the disciplining of welfare recipients and the collec-
tion of mandatory welfare contributions. In short, bor-
ders and hierarchies facilitated the emergence of national 
welfare states and national communities of solidarity, 
both mutually reinforcing each other. 
EU solidarity can draw much less on borders and hierar-
chies than national welfare states. The borders of the EU 
are wide and incomplete. They include not only half a bil-
lion individuals but also 28 pre-existing national sharing 
communities at very different levels of economic devel-
opment. Also, EU borders are open to revision through 
enlargement or individual exit (e.g. Brexit). Wide borders 
increase the size and heterogeneity of the risk pool, thus 
raising the potential benefits of solidarity. At the same 
time, however, they also increase the moral hazard pre-
dicament. Individual moral hazard is compounded by 
national-level moral hazard, as member state govern-
ments exploit European solidarity in order to facilitate 
national solidarity among their national citizens. In addi-
tion, the incompleteness of EU borders raises the spectre 
of enlargement to bad risks (i.e. poor and vulnerable 
states entering) and the exiting of good risks (i.e. rich, 
resilient member states leaving). 
Hierarchical enforcement is weaker partly because the 
EU lacks the institutional apparatus to enforce payment 
obligations or behavioural restrictions on the member 
states. Perhaps more importantly, given the pre-existence 
of rather popular national (welfare) sharing commu-
nities, EU level enforcement of European contributory 
obligations or behavioural constraints can easily be seen 
as foreign imposition. As a consequence, European soli-
darity has to rely more on spontaneous public support 
by EU citizens and member governments, and can rely 
less on institutional facilitation than national solidarity. 
III. Public support for European solidarity
How strong is public support for European solidarity? 
In April 2018, YouGov conducted a survey in 11 EU 
member states1 to explore this question. The results show 
that the support for European solidarity varies with the 
issues involved (solidarity for what?), the instruments 
used (solidarity how?) and by member state (solidarity by 
whom and for whom?). 
▶ European solidarity is 
potentially beneficial 
because it encompasses a 
large and heterogeneous risk 
pool.
▶ European solidarity is highly 
contingent on spontaneous 
public support because it cannot 
draw on the institutional 
support structures that sustain 
solidarity at the national level: 
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Variation by issue 
Two survey items measure respondents’ support for Euro-
pean solidarity depending on the policy issues involved: 
Would respondents support or oppose financial solidarity 
with another member state suffering from unsustainable 
debt, very high unemployment, large numbers of refu-
gees, or natural disaster? Would they support military 
assistance to a member state under foreign attack? Figure 
1 summarizes the main results. 






Support for European solidarity by issue 
Don't know Oppose Support 
Figure 1 highlights two features. First, support for Euro-
pean solidarity varies strongly with the issue. Support 
is strongest (and opposition lowest) in case of natural 
disaster. Support is lowest (and opposition highest) in 
case of excessive debt. Support for European solidarity on 
issues of high unemployment, large refugee inflows, or 
foreign attack ranges between these two extremes. 
Second, low support for European solidarity is associated 
with ambiguity and uncertainty about the desirability 
of solidarity as indicated by the share of ‘don’t know’ 
responses. While less than 10 percent of respondents 
‘don’t know’ whether they should support (or oppose) 
European solidarity in case of a natural disaster, close 
to 30 percent don’t know whether to support (or not) an 
over-indebted member state. 
Closer inspection of the data reveals low cross-country 
variation in issue rankings. Natural disaster triggers 
the highest support for solidarity in all 11 member states 
included in the YouGov survey. Unsustainable debt is 
associated with the lowest support for solidarity in all 
states but Greece. Also, the ranking of the other issues 
(unemployment, refugees, attack) largely follows the pat-
tern of figure 1.2 
Natural disaster is an easy issue for European solidarity 
because such disasters have exogenous causes (i.e. moral 
hazard is not an issue) and they are one-off (no long-
term transfers and obligations involved). Unsustainable 
debt, by contrast, is a difficult solidarity issue because it 
has endogenous causes (i.e. moral hazard by the over-in-
debted state is an issue) and may involve long-term 
transfers and obligations (because national debt is par-
tially driven by systemic interdependencies created by the 
Single Market or Monetary Union). 
Foreign attack and large refugee inflows resemble natural 
disasters in that their causes are mostly exogenous and 
the required assistance is of the one-off emergency assis-
tance type. Hence, support for solidarity is fairly solid. 
High unemployment, by contrast, resembles the problem 
of unsustainable debt: endogenous causes and a need for 
long-term or permanent risk and burden sharing. Sup-
port for European solidarity is correspondingly low.
In conclusion, the good news is that solidarity instincts 
are similar across member states. This should facilitate 
intergovernmental agreement on joint risk and burden 
sharing. The bad news is that spontaneous solidarity is 
highest for risk types that matter little in the EU, i.e. for 
natural disasters (usually too small to require European 
solidarity) and military attacks (core competence of 
NATO, not EU). Solidarity is lowest for risk types that are 
central to the EU’s Single Market and EMU – debt and 
unemployment. Yet, there is a glimmer of hope: the high 
Survey question: Thinking about different sorts of problems and crises 
that could hit other members of the European Union, do you think EU 
countries should be willing to offer financial aid to another member 
state in the following circumstances?
Available answers: Other member states should give them financial 
help (support); Other member states should not give them financial 
help (oppose); Don’t know.
Survey question (military attack): If another European Union country 
came under military attack by a country outside the European Union, 
would you support or oppose your country coming to its military 
defence?
Available answers: Strongly support, tend to support (support); Strongly 
oppose, tend to oppose (oppose); Don’t know.
Figure 1
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share of ‘don’t know’ responses associated with the issues 
of debt and unemployment points large groups of Euro-
pean citizens who are undecided, and potentially open 
for political cueing. This opens a space for boosting sup-
port for European solidarity through political leadership 
in public discourse. National leaders in particular would 
have to speak up. Finally, also on a positive note, support 
for (financial!) solidarity on the refugee issue is surpris-
ingly high even in countries like Poland and Lithuania.
Variation by instrument
What do respondents think are the best instrument for 
solidary risk and burden sharing in the EU? The YouGov 
survey offers three choices: a common emergency fund 
set up ex ante by all member states to help any of them 
encountering bad risk in the future; ex ante investment 
aid for weak member states to strengthen their econo-
mies and reduce their vulnerability to future bad risk; ex 
post emergency assistance mobilised on a case-by-case 
basis after a member state was hit by bad risk. 
As figure 2 shows, the ex ante emergency fund enjoys 
most support among survey respondents, followed by ex 
post case-by-case assistance, and ex ante investment aid. 
Closer inspection of the data reveals cross-national con-
vergence on the ex ante emergency fund as the preferred 
risk sharing instrument: respondents in 10 of the 11 
member states in the YouGov survey rank the emergency 
fund over the two alternative risk sharing instruments. 
There is more cross-country variance in the second and 
third preference. Respondents in Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Great Britain, and Sweden offer more 
support for solidarity by ex post case-by-case assistance 
than by ex ante investment aid. One assumes this is in 
order to keep a closer check on where their money goes. 
Respondents in Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Poland and 
Spain, by contrast, prefer ex ante investment aid to ex post 
case-by-case assistance. Perhaps this is because they expect 
their home countries to be net-beneficiaries of investment 
aid. Also the Eurozone crisis may have undermined their 
trust in the reliability and generosity of ex post case-by-case 
assistance. We come back to these issues below. 
The broad support of emergency fund schemes across 
member states is good news for projects like the Euro-
pean Monetary Fund or the European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme that can plausibly be presented as ex ante emer-
gency funds of this sort. Yet, it warns against attempts 
to sell a potential Eurozone budget as an ‘investment 
budget’. It may be more convincing to present it as a gen-
eral ‘rainy day’ fund providing re-insurance against bad 
risks across a broad range of policies – economic, social, 
security, defence – but leaves investment to the national 
level to increase ‘ownership’.
Note also that large majorities of respondents in all 
member states prefer ex ante instruments for European 










▶ Public support for European 
solidarity is high, and 
uncertainty is low, if issues 
are exogenous and one-off 
(natural disaster, military 
attack).
▶ Support for solidarity is 
low, and uncertainty is high, 
if issues are endogenous and 
potentially permanent (debt 
crises, high unemployment).
▶ Little cross-national variation
TAKE 
AWAY




None of these 
Don’t know 
Support for European solidarity by instrument 
Survey question: Thinking more specifically, which of the following do 
you think would be the best way for better off European Union coun-
tries to give financial aid to other member states?
Available answers: EU countries should pay into an emergency fund, 
which could be accessed in the future if a member country faces a crisis 
of some sort (Emergency fund); EU countries should not pay any extra 
money now, but contribute money on a case-by-case basis if a member 
country faces a crisis of some sort (Case-by-case assistance); EU coun-
tries should pay money into reducing potential risk now, with better off 
countries giving money to worse off countries to make their economies 
stronger (Investment aid); None of these; Don’t know.
Figure 2
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exclusive reliance on ex post case-by-case assistance. In 
other words, there is support for precautionary instru-
ments of solidarity. 
Variation by member state
Despite broad similarities in the rank ordering of issues 
and instruments, there are significant cross-national dif-
ferences in the level of support for European solidarity. 
As the YouGov survey shows, support for European soli-
darity depends on whether respondents expect their own 
country to end up at the giving or the receiving end of the 
solidarity relation. People favour solidarity if they think 
that other member states will pay for it; they oppose sol-
idarity when they think their own state will have to pay 
up. Importantly, however, there is variation across issues 
and instruments. 
Figures 3a and 3b show a strong correlation between 
respondents’ support for solidarity on debt (issue) and 
for cross-border investment aid (instrument), on one 
hand, and respondents’ perception of their home state’s 
net financial-contribution to European solidarity, on the 
other hand.3 There is a stark divide between one group 
of self-perceived net-contributors (Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Sweden, UK) and another group of self-per-
ceived net-recipients (Greece, Lithuania, Poland, Spain), 
with France and Italy somewhere in between. Respon-
dents in net-contributor countries offer little support for 
European solidarity; respondents in net-recipient coun-
tries are all in favour. 
Figures 4a and 4b replicate the set-up of figures 3a and 
3b to investigate support for financial solidarity for high 
refugee numbers (issue), and support for a joint emer-
gency fund (instrument) respectively. While the level of 
solidarity still reflects the perceived net-financial position 
of the respondents’ home state in European solidarity, the 
correlation is much more muted (figure 4b – emergency 
fund) or virtually non-existent (figure 4a - refugees). 
Wealth heterogeneities among the member states recede 
▶ There is broad support for 
an ex ante emergency fund 
(‘rainy day fund’)
▶ Support for ex ante investment 
aid and case-by-case assistance 
splits along country lines
▶ Respondents in all member 
states prefer precautionary 
instruments (i.e. ex ante 
emergency fund or ex ante 
























-40% - 20% 0 % 20% 40% 60% 80% 
Own state perceived as net contributor (+)/ recipient (-) 
Support for solidarity with country having high 
debt 
 X-axes in figures 3a and 3b report the difference between the share of 
people in each countries that perceived their own state as net contribu-
tor and as a recipient of EU aids, taken from the following survey 
question: ‘Imagine there was an EU fund to help member states facing a 
crisis of some sort. Over the long term, do you think COUNTRY would 
end up being…
A country that puts more into such a fund than it gets out of it (net 
contributor); A country that gets more out of such a fund than it puts 
into it (net recipient); A country that gets about the same amount out 
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Own state perceived as net contributor (+)/ recipient (-) 
Support for solidarity through ex ante investment 
aid 
Figure 3b
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Own state perceived as net contributor (+)/ recipient (-) 
Support for solidarity through ex ante emergency 
fund 
to the background. Other heterogeneities come to the 
fore, some of them quite surprising. 
Support for European solidarity is often low among Polish 
and Lithuanian respondents even though they perceive 
their home countries as likely net-beneficiaries. Yet, their 
solidarity on the refugee issue is actually higher than in 
France. France exhibits the lowest level of solidarity of all 
11 member states in figures 4a and 4b, and is also consis-
tently below the regression line in figures 3a and 3b. The 
Nordic countries also exhibit consistently low support 
for European solidarity. German respondents’ by con-
trast tend to exhibit higher levels of solidarity than the 
perceived net-contributor position of Germany would 
suggest. German support for a joint EU emergency fund 
is higher than in all other states, but Italy. Support for 
European solidarity in the Southern periphery is gener-
ally high. Yet, there are exceptions. For instance, Greek 
support for an EU emergency fund is relatively low (on a 
par with the UK). 
IV. Four lessons 
European solidarity is difficult
The scope for European solidarity is constrained by dis-
tributive conflict between (self-perceived) net-contrib-
utors in the North (especially the Nordic countries and 
Germany) and net-recipients in the South and, to a lesser 
extent, in the East. 
European solidarity exists 
There are issues and instruments of solidarity that 
attract spontaneous support across the distributive 
divide: European solidarity on issues of natural disaster, 
military attack, and, to a lesser extent, refugees enjoys 
broad support in Northern, Southern, and Eastern 
member states; a joint emergency fund is the preferred 
instrument of solidarity in (almost) all member states. 
In fact, national publics may sometimes be more sup-
portive of European solidarity than their governments. 





















-40% - 20% 0 % 20% 40% 60% 80% 
Own state perceived as net contributor (+)/ recipient (-) 
Support for solidarity with country having large 
numbers of refugees 
 X-axes in figures 4a and 4b report the difference between the share of 
people in each countries that perceived their own state as net contribu-
tor and as a recipient of EU aids, taken from the following survey 
question: ‘Imagine there was an EU fund to help member states facing a 
crisis of some sort. Over the long term, do you think COUNTRY would 
end up being…
A country that puts more into such a fund than it gets out of it (net 
contributor); A country that gets more out of such a fund than it puts 
into it (net recipient); A country that gets about the same amount out 
of such a fund as it puts into it (not used); Not sure (not used).
Figure 4b
▶ Cross-national differences 
in wealth erode support for 
European solidarity in self-
perceived net-contributor 
states.
▶ The resistance of self-
perceived net-contributors to 
European solidarity varies 
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public are not closer to the Euro-vision of French Pres-
ident Macron than to the fiscal orthodoxy of their own 
ministry of finance. As the YouGov survey shows, the 
‘rainy day fund’ logic underlying proposals for an EMF, 
for a joint deposit insurance scheme or, arguably, for a 
joint Eurozone budget receives very strong support from 
German respondents.
European solidarity can be leveraged
The scope of European solidarity can be expanded 
by linking controversial issues and instruments. For 
instance, a mix of ex ante investment aid and ex post 
assistance may garner more spontaneous public support 
across member states than each of these instruments on 
its own. For this purpose, ex post assistance would have to 
be made conditional on the proper use of ex ante invest-
ment aid. The investment aid would incentivise recipient 
countries; the conditionality would reassure donor coun-
tries. Why not, for instance, allow struggling economies 
to (temporarily) breach the 3% deficit rule on condition 
they use the additional fiscal space to fast-forward capac-
itating investments? In a similar vein, a link between the 
debt and the refugee issue may increase support for soli-
darity on both. On the one hand, large refugee numbers 
induce fiscal expansion in surplus countries like Germany 
and Sweden, thus mitigating adjustment pressures on 
deficit countries. On the other hand, large refugee num-
bers in debtor countries may facilitate support for debt 
relief in creditor countries. Obviously, such instrument- 
or issue-linkages would have to be explained in public 
because their logics are not necessarily self-evident. 
European solidarity needs explaining 
European publics often don’t know whether to support 
or oppose European solidarity. Their uncertainty rises 
with the complexity of European arrangements that mix 
and match risk and burden sharing across issues and 
instruments. This is a problem but also an opportunity. 
It opens space for increasing support for European soli-
darity through political leadership. This leadership would 
have to come primarily from the national level (with the 
usual brokering by EU actors in the background). Policy 
makers in (self-perceived) net-contributor states would 
have to explain why European solidarity may be in the 
long-run national interest even if it involves short-run 
costs. Policy makers in net-recipient member states 
would have to explain why some measure of external dis-
cipline might be required to reassure donors. The polit-
ical risks are obvious. However, voters are not stupid and 
they may actually listen to good reasons. Large major-
ities across all member states want to stay in the EU. If 
this requires more European solidarity, it may be useful 
to tell them. 
Endnotes:    
1 The survey covers 11 EU member states. Total sample size was 1692 (Great 
Britain), 1005 (France), 1017 (Germany), 1030 (Denmark), 1019 (Sweden), 981 
(Finland), 956 (Poland), 738 (Lithuania), 746 (Greece), 1065 (Italy), and 1035 
(Spain) adult respondents. Fieldwork was undertaken between 18th - 30th 
April 2018.  The survey was carried out online. All figures are based on data 
taken from the YouGov survey. 
2 There are five exceptions. Respondents in Poland and Lithuania rank sol-
idarity in case of unemployment over solidarity in case of refugee inflows. 
Greek, Italian, and Swedish respondents support solidarity on the refugee issue 
more strongly than solidarity in case of a foreign attack. 
3 Replacing unsustainable debt by high unemployment in figure 3a yields an 
even stronger correlation. Replacing investment support by case-by-case emer-
gency assistance yields the reverse image of figure 3b: respondents in net-con-
tributor countries are in favor, respondents in net-recipient countries are more 
skeptical. 
